Cyber Activist Sentenced to 3-Years for Expressing Support to Tibetan Protesters

CHRD: China Human Rights Defenders
2008-12-4 16:44:26
http://crd-net.org/Article/Class9/Class10/200812/20081204164426_12184.html

(Chinese Human Rights Defenders, November 21, 2008) - Today, Chen Daojun (陈道军), a cyber activist and freelance writer based in the Southwestern province Sichuan, was convicted of "inciting subversion of state power" and sentenced to three years of imprisonment and deprivation of political rights for three years for posting articles on the Internet to express views supporting the March 2008 Tibetan protesters.

Chen's verdict was announced at 11 a.m. this morning by Chendu Intermediate People's Court in Sichuan. Chen's family and his lawyer, Zhu Jiuhu (朱久虎), were present at the hearing. Chen is dissatisfied with the verdict but it is considering whether he is going to appeal.

On November 5, Chen was tried for "inciting secession" by the same court. It is unclear why the court dropped the charge of "inciting secession" and convicted Chen of "inciting subversion". The court clearly rejected the lawyer's "not guilty" defense on the basis that Mr. Chen has the right to free expression of his political views.

Recommendations

CHRD calls on Chen's immediate and unconditional release.

CHRD believes that Chen has been imprisoned solely for the peaceful activities of expressing his opinions. The authorities have abused Chen's rights to freedom of expression guaranteed in Articles 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China has signed (but not yet ratified). This right is also enshrined in Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution.

Background

Chen, 40, is a cyber activist and freelance writer from Jintang Township, Chengdu City, Sichuan Province.

Chen was apprehended on May 9 and officially detained on suspicion of "inciting subversion of state power" on May 10. At some point during Chen's detention, the charge "inciting subversion" was dropped and replaced by "inciting secession". The reason for this change was not known. On June 13, Chen was formally arrested by Chengdu City Procuratorate for "inciting secession". However, the charge of "inciting succession" was dropped and Chen was convicted of "inciting subversion of state power" today.

Following the March 14, 2008 riots/demonstrations in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, Chen published online several articles that supported the Tibetans who protested against the Chinese government. Chengdu City Procuratorate prosecuted Chen on the basis of one of the articles, "the Government Forces the People to Rebel--a Tribute to the Tibetans who Staged a Heroic Struggle", in addition to two others he authored --"What to Do after the 17th Party Congress" and "The Background of Those People Who are Against Westernization". The Procuratorate alleged that certain words and sentences in these articles "incited secession".

For more information, please visit http://crd-net.org/ and see:

Detained Sichuan Activists Denied Access to Legal Counsel (June 25, 2008)

Cyber Activists Detained for "Inciting" Anti-Pollution March in Chengdu (May
12, 2008)

Wei Jingsheng: Speaking about the Current Financial Crisis

Wei Jingsheng Attended the Festival of Modernity: Democracy, in Milan, Italy and Spoke about the Current Financial Crisis

On November 29 and 30th of 2008, Mr. Wei Jingsheng was invited to attend the Festival of Modernity: Democracy, organized by the publisher Spirali in Milan, Italy. The festival was also attended by other well-known Chinese, including Lu Decheng and author Zhou Qing. Other attendees include the former Russian Minister of Energy, dissident writers and well-known painters, as well as authors and philosophers from various European countries.

In Wei Jingsheng's speech, he pointed out that, although the current hottest topic is the financial crisis, very few people noticed that the Western democratic system is running into trouble itself. The main reason that makes this a widespread and in-depth crisis is due to the adjustment of the global manufacturing sector in the last 20 to 30 years. The difference between these current adjustments in comparison to any previous adjustment of the manufacturing sector is that this adjustment was not produced by large-scale technical progress. Instead, without any major technical progress, this adjustment was produced by the availability of large amounts of cheap labor that attracted the investment and thus caused the transfer of capital. The characteristic of this type of capital transfer is that, on one side, multi-national companies win high profit; while on the other side, there is large-scale unemployment in the developed countries. Or to put it in a different way, while the capital was transferred to the undeveloped countries and areas, the global economy was going backwards instead of forward. The displayed feature is the huge trade deficit; the developed countries were eating their own future away, living hand to mouth.

Wei said: "this time I was in Germany participating a dispute, which exposed the infiltration of the Chinese Communist Party to the democratic countries. By infiltrating the Western news media and political circle, the Chinese Communists tried to paint a pretty picture of its system that made high profit through cruel exploitation. While the Chinese bureaucratic capitalists and Western big business share this huge profit, the Chinese workers are living miserably and the Western workers lost their jobs.

Wei further pointed out that: "Why didn't the governments of these developed countries notice this problem, and instead used the unfair trade policies to push the situation further? Why for a long time, would they accept a trade policy that is not beneficial to their own countries? We all know that the lobbying of big business had the determining effect on this, an effect that almost nothing can resist. The democratic system ran into a boulder in the river. This current financial crisis did not accumulate in a short time; nor was it due to purely economic reasons. The deeper layers of reasons include that the democratic system has been off of its original tracks; that money manipulated or influenced politics. Now, this democracy has been discounted. As we resolve the economic crisis, we should make a time table to reform the political system in the Western countries themselves."

[For more information, please visit www.WeiJingSheng.org]

An Open Letter to the PRC Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Public Security, Supreme People’s Procuratorate and Supreme People’s Court

If you wish to support the open letter in English, please send you name, country or city of residency, affiliation or profession, to wangrongfen44@googlemail.com, or t.shaojiang@gmail.com

(more signatures will be added later)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PS: more than 1000 people have signed the open letter. Please refer to Petition website and Sohu Blog in Chinese.


An Open Letter to the PRC Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Public Security, Supreme People’s Procuratorate and Supreme People’s Court

Case: The case of homicide at Shanghai Public Security Bureau Zhabei Branch July 1, 2008

Invoking:
1. Press release of Shanghai Public Security Bureau on July 7, 2008
2. Indictment by the Second Branch of Shanghai Municipal People's Procuratorate ([2008] No. 123)
3. Shanghai Criminal Verdict by the Second Intermediate People's Court of Shanghai ([2008] No. 99)
4. Criminal Ruling by the Shanghai Higher People's Court ([2008] No. 131)

Annex: Analysis of the Yang Jia case


People's Republic of China
Department of Justice,
The Ministry of Public Security,
The Supreme People's Procuratorate and
The Supreme People's Court,

A vicious manslaughter took place in the building of Shanghai Public Security Bureau, Zhabei Branch on July 1, 2008, killing six police officers and injuring four. At 9:40 AM, Mr. Yang Jia, a resident of Beijing, climbed along staircase to the 21st floor where the Inspector’s Office is located to inquire about the result of his complaint. At 9:45 AM, a physical confrontation occurred between Yang and the police, and he was then brought to a special interrogation room on the second floor. Mr. Yang Jia insisted that he would not reply to any questions without the presence of a lawyer. As was revealed to the press by the government legal adviser who was ordered to come by the Zhabei Procuratorate and Xie Youming who later became Mr. Yang Jia’s defense counsel, the interrogation lasted for two hours, but neither side had ever mentioned the case of manslaughter.

Police of Zhabei hurried to clear and clean the scene until midnight and on July 2 the offices resumed open to public.

On July 4, the detection of the case was declared completed and was transferred to the Second Branch of Shanghai Municipal People's Procuratorate. On July 7, the Shanghai Municipal Public Security Bureau held a press conference, saying that the killing of the policemen on July 1 was voluntarily done by Mr. Yang Jia in revenge.

On July 17, the Second Branch of the Shanghai Municipal Procuratorate filed a persecution against Mr. Yang Jia on suspicion of voluntary manslaughter of the police.

On July 23, six police officers were cremated.

On September 1, Shanghai Second Intermediate People's Court sentenced Yang Jia to death on the charge of voluntary manslaughter.

Mr. Yang Jia refused to accept the sentence so he filed an appeal.

On October 20, the Shanghai Municipal Higher People's Court rejected the appeal and upheld the death sentence. The case was then reported to the Supreme People's Court for review.

According to the judicial documents and a large number of media exposure, we maintained that the proceedings of the detection, indictment and trail of the case is a serious breach of the relevant provisions of "the Law of Criminal Procedure of the People's Republic of China".

Contrary to the rule of challenge defined by Item 4 of Article 28 in the "Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China", the detection was done by the Public Security Bureau Zhabei Branch which is also the target of the killing and the whole process of detection was even under the charge of one of the victims – the deputy Party Sectary of the Discipline Inspection of the Branch Bureau. The collection of testimonies of witnesses is illegal and self-contradictory. There are many faults in the legal examination of the crime scene and forensic evidences. The crime scene was quickly cleared and cleaned. No DNA and fingerprint identifications have ever been made on the suspected criminal or on the witnesses, particularly the colleagues of the dead. Four senior police officers on the first floor were stabbed to death but none of their colleagues have ever given any testimony – an obvious point of suspicion of this case.

The public prosecutor, the Second Branch of the Shanghai Municipal People's Procuratorate, involved in the detection of the case and designated Mr. Xie Youming, the legal adviser of the Zhabei Government as the defense counsel of the suspect Mr. Yang Jia. The public prosecutor also sent Mr. Xie to the Compulsory Treatment Administration of Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau where Mrs. Wang Jingmei, mother of Mr. Yang Jia, was under compulsory treatment and forced her to sign on the Power of Attorney. In addition, the public prosecutor refused the defense counsel hired by Mr. Yang Fusheng, father of Mr. Yang Jia, and did not allow Mr. Yang Fusheng to meet with Yang Jia. All these are in violation of item 10 of "The Regulations Regard to the Implementation of the Law of Criminal Procedure by the Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Justice, and Commission of Legislative Affairs of the NPCSC.”

Both trial courts did not review the major evidences, or summon most of the witnesses, in particular the main witnesses, or verify the Inspection Report (No.2008-0091) by the Criminalistics Examination Center of Shanghai Public Security Bureau and the Record of On-Spot Inspection by the Shanghai Municipal Public Security Bureau (No. 2008-0069) and by Shanghai Public Security Bureau Zhabei Branch (No. 2008-1841). Nor did the courts answer the critical question raised by the accused: "How can you prove that the man wearing a mask is me, Yang Jia?"

In view of the insufficiency of evidence in accusing Yang Jia on the charge of voluntary manslaughter, we demand the immediate release of the accused.

In view of the transgressions committed by the Shanghai Municipal Public Security Bureau, Procuratorate Bureau and Justice Bureau in the detection, the indictment and trial of this case, we urge the Central Ministries to investigate and deal with their respective subordinates, remove from office those who failed to perform their duty properly and punish those who violated the law.

In view of the complexity of the case, we hope the Chinese government could deal with it seriously. A special group should be set up to re-detect this case, so that the truth could be brought out to the public.

With best regards,

WANG Rongfen, SHAO Jiang, HU Ping, ZHONG Weiguang, HUAN Xuewen

Cc: National People's Congress and the State Council, the United Nations Human Rights Council, the European Parliament Commission on Human Rights, Amnesty International, and non-governmental organizations around the world

November 20, 2008

If you wish to support the open letter in English, please send you name, country or city of residency, affiliation or profession, to wangrongfen44@googlemail.com, or t.shaojiang@gmail.com

(more signatures will be added later)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PS: more than 1000 people have signed the open letter. Please refer to Petition website and Sohu Blog in Chinese.

Position of the Tibetan Exile Government

[The following is the memorandum prepared by the Dalai Lama's representatives for the ninth round of dialogue-negotiation in Beijing, between the Tibetan government in exile and the Chinese central government.

The text is taken from the Tibetan woman poet, writer, and activist Woeser's blog (mainly in Chinese).]


THE MEMORANDUM ON GENUINE AUTONOMY FOR THE TIBETAN PEOPLE

I INTRODUCTION

Since the renewal of direct contact with the Central Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 2002, extensive discussions have been held between the envoys of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama and representatives of the Central Government. In these discussions we have put forth clearly the aspirations of Tibetans. The essence of the Middle Way Approach is to secure genuine autonomy for the Tibetan people within the scope of the Constitution of the PRC. This is of mutual benefit and based on the long-term interest of both the Tibetan and Chinese peoples. We remain firmly committed not to seek separation or independence. We are seeking a solution to the Tibetan problem through genuine autonomy, which is compatible with the principles on autonomy in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The protection and development of the unique Tibetan identity in all its aspects serves the larger interest of humanity in general and those of the Tibetan and Chinese people in particular.

During the seventh round of talks in Beijing on 1 and 2 July 2008, the Vice Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and the Minister of the Central United Front Work Department, Mr. Du Qinglin, explicitly invited suggestions from His Holiness the Dalai Lama for the stability and development of Tibet. The Executive Vice Minister of the Central United Front Work Department, Mr. Zhu Weiqun, further said they would like to hear our views on the degree or form of autonomy we are seeking as well as on all aspects of regional autonomy within the scope of the Constitution of the PRC.

Accordingly, this memorandum puts forth our position on genuine autonomy and how the specific needs of the Tibetan nationality for autonomy and self-government can be met through application of the principles on autonomy of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, as we understand them. On this basis, His Holiness the Dalai Lama is confident that the basic needs of the Tibetan nationality can be met through genuine autonomy within the PRC.

The PRC is a multi-national state, and as in many other parts of the world, it seeks to resolve the nationality question through autonomy and the self-government of the minority nationalities. The Constitution of the PRC contains fundamental principles on autonomy and self-government whose objectives are compatible with the needs and aspirations of the Tibetans. Regional national autonomy is aimed at opposing both the oppression and the separation of nationalities by rejecting both Han Chauvinism and local nationalism. It is intended to ensure the protection of the culture and the identity of minority nationalities by powering them to become masters of their own affairs.

To a very considerable extent Tibetan needs can be met within the constitutional principles on autonomy, as we understand them. On several points, the Constitution gives significant discretionary powers to state organs in the decision-making and on the operation of the system of autonomy. These discretionary powers can be exercised to facilitate genuine autonomy for Tibetans in ways that would respond to the uniqueness of the Tibetan situation. In implementing these principles, legislation relevant to autonomy may consequently need to be reviewed or amended to respond to the specific characteristics and needs of the Tibetan nationality. Given good will on both sides, outstanding problems can be resolved within the constitutional principles on autonomy. In this way national unity and stability and harmonious relations between the Tibetan and other nationalities will be established.

II RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE TIBETAN NATIONALITY

Tibetans belong to one minority nationality regardless of the current administrative division. The integrity of the Tibetan nationality must be respected. That is the spirit, the intent and the principle underlying the constitutional concept of national regional autonomy as well as the principle of equality of nationalities.

There is no dispute about the fact that Tibetans share the same language, culture, spiritual tradition, core values and customs, that they belong to the same ethnic group and that they have a strong sense of common identity. Tibetans share a common history and despite periods of political or administrative divisions, Tibetans continuously remained united by their religion, culture, education, language, way of life and by their unique high plateau environment.

The Tibetan nationality lives in one contiguous area on the Tibetan plateau, which they have inhabited for millennia and to which they are therefore indigenous. For purposes of the constitutional principles of national regional autonomy Tibetans in the PRC in fact live as a single nationality all over the Tibetan plateau.

On account of the above reasons, the PRC has recognised the Tibetan nationality as one of the 55 minority nationalities.

III TIBETAN ASPIRATIONS

Tibetans have a rich and distinct history, culture and spiritual tradition all of which form valuable parts of the heritage of humanity. Not only do Tibetans wish to preserve their own heritage, which they cherish, but equally they wish to further develop their culture and spiritual life and knowledge in ways that are particularly suited to the needs and conditions of humanity in the 21st century.

As a part of the multi-national state of the PRC, Tibetans can benefit greatly from the rapid economic and scientific development the country is experiencing. While wanting to actively participate and contribute to this development, we want to ensure that this happens without the people losing their Tibetan identity, culture and core values and without putting the distinct and fragile environment of the Tibetan plateau, to which Tibetans are indigenous, at risk.

The uniqueness of the Tibetan situation has consistently been recognised within the PRC and has been reflected in the terms of the "17 Point Agreement" and in statements and policies of successive leaders of the PRC since then, and should remain the basis for defining the scope and structure of the specific autonomy to be exercised by the Tibetan nationality within the PRC. The Constitution reflects a fundamental principle of flexibility to accommodate special situations, including the special characteristics and needs of minority nationalities.

His Holiness the Dalai Lama's commitment to seek a solution for the Tibetan people within the PRC is clear and unambiguous. This position is in full compliance and agreement with paramount leader Deng Xiaoping's statement in which he emphasised that except for independence all other issues could be resolved through dialogue. Whereas, we are committed, therefore, to fully respect the territorial integrity of the PRC, we expect the Central Government to recognise and fully respect the integrity of the Tibetan nationality and its right to exercise genuine autonomy within the PRC. We believe that this is the basis for resolving the differences between us and promoting unity, stability and harmony among nationalities.

For Tibetans to advance as a distinct nationality within the PRC, they need to continue to progress and develop economically, socially and politically in ways that correspond to the development of the PRC and the world as a whole while respecting and nurturing the Tibetan characteristics of such development. For this to happen, it is imperative that the right of Tibetans to govern themselves be recognised and implemented throughout the region where they live in compact communities in the PRC, in accordance with the Tibetan nationality??s own needs, priorities and characteristics.

The Tibetan people's culture and identity can only be preserved and promoted by the Tibetans themselves and not by any others. Therefore, Tibetans should be capable of self-help, self-development and self-government, and an optimal balance needs to be found between this and the necessary and welcome guidance and assistance for Tibet from the Central Government and other provinces and regions of the PRC.

IV BASIC NEEDS OF TIBETANS

Subject Matters of Self-government

1) Language

Language is the most important attribute of the Tibetan people's identity. Tibetan is the primary means of communication, the language in which their literature, their spiritual texts and historical as well as scientific works are written. The Tibetan language is not only at the same high level as that of Sanskrit in terms of grammar, but is also the only one that has the capability of translating from Sanskrit without an iota of error. Therefore, Tibetan language has not only the richest and best-translated literatures, many scholars even contend that it has also the richest and largest number of literary compositions. The Constitution of the PRC, in Article 4, guarantees the freedom of all nationalities "to use and develop their own spoken and written languages ...".

In order for Tibetans to use and develop their own language, Tibetan must be respected as the main spoken and written language. Similarly, the principal language of the Tibetan autonomous areas needs to be Tibetan.

This principle is broadly recognised in the Constitution in Article 121, which states, "[T]he organs of self-government of the national autonomous areas employ the spoken and written language or language in common use in the locality." Article 10 of the Law on Regional National Autonomy (LRNA) provides that these organs "shall guarantee the freedom of the nationalities in these areas to use and develop their own spoken and written languages...."

Consistent with the principle of recognition of Tibetan as the main language in Tibetan areas, the LRNA (Article 36) also allows the autonomous government authorities to decide on "the language used in instruction and enrolment procedures" with regard to education. This implies recognition of the principle that the principal medium of education be Tibetan.

2) Culture

The concept of national regional autonomy is primarily for the purpose of preservation of the culture of minority nationalities. Consequently, the constitution of PRC contains references to cultural preservation in Articles 22, 47 and 119 as also in Article 38 of the LRNA. To Tibetans, Tibetan culture is closely connected to our religion, tradition, language and identity, which are facing threats at various levels. Since Tibetans live within the multinational state of the PRC, this distinct Tibetan cultural heritage needs protection through appropriate constitutional provisions.

3) Religion

Religion is fundamental to Tibetans and Buddhism is closely linked to their identity. We recognise the importance of separation of church and state, but this should not affect the freedom and practice of believers. It is impossible for Tibetans to imagine personal or community freedom without the freedom of belief, conscience and religion. The Constitution recognises the importance of religion and protects the right to profess it. Article 36 guarantees all citizens the right to the freedom of religious belief. No one can compel another to believe in or not to believe in any religion. Discrimination on the basis of religion is forbidden.

An interpretation of the constitutional principle in light of international standard would also cover the freedom of the manner of belief or worship. The freedom covers the right of monasteries to be organised and run according to Buddhist monastic tradition, to engage in teachings and studies, and to enroll any number of monks and nuns or age group in accordance with these rules. The normal practice to hold public teachings and the empowerment of large gatherings is covered by this freedom and the state should not interfere in religious practices and traditions, such as the relationship between a teacher and his disciple, management of monastic institutions, and the recognition of reincarnations.

4) Education

The desire of Tibetans to develop and administer their own education system in cooperation and in coordination with the central government's ministry of education is supported by the principles contained in the Constitution with regard to education. So is the aspiration to engage in and contribute to the development of science and technology. We note the increasing recognition in international scientific development of the contribution which Buddhist psychology, metaphysics, cosmology and the understanding of the mind is making to modern science.

Whereas, under Article 19 of the Constitution the state takes on the overall responsibility to provide education for its citizens, Article 119 recognises the principle that "[T]he organs of self-government of the national autonomous areas independently administer educational .... affairs in their respective areas..." This principle is also reflected in Article 36 of the LRNA.

Since the degree of autonomy in decision-making is unclear, the point to be emphasised is that the Tibetan need to exercise genuine autonomy with regard to its own nationality's education and this is supported by the principles of the constitution on autonomy.

As for the aspiration to engage in and contribute to the development of scientific knowledge and technology, the Constitution (Article 119) and the LRNA (Article 39) clearly recognise the right of autonomous areas to develop scientific knowledge and technology.

5) Environment Protection

Tibet is the prime source of Asia's great rivers. It also has the earth's loftiest mountains as well as the world's most extensive and highest plateau, rich in mineral resources, ancient forests, and many deep valleys untouched by human disturbances.

This environmental protection practice was enhanced by the Tibetan people's traditional respect for all forms of life, which prohibits the harming of all sentient beings, whether human or animal. Tibet used to be an unspoiled wilderness sanctuary in a unique natural environment.

Today, Tibet's traditional environment is suffering irreparable damage. The effects of this are especially notable on the grasslands, the croplands, the forests, the water resources and the wildlife.

In view of this, according to Articles 45 and 66 of the LNRA, the Tibetan people should be given the right over the environment and allow them to follow their traditional conservation practices.

6) Utilisation of Natural Resources

With respect to the protection and management of the natural environment and the utilisation of natural resources the Constitution and the LRNA only acknowledge a limited role for the organs of self-government of the autonomous areas (see LRNA Articles 27, 28, 45, 66, and Article 118 of the Constitution, which pledges that the state "shall give due consideration to the interests of [the national autonomous areas]]." The LRNA recognises the importance for the autonomous areas to protect and develop forests and grasslands (Article 27) and to "give priority to the rational exploitation and utilization of the natural resources that the local authorities are entitled to develop," but only within the limits of state plans and legal stipulations. In fact, the central role of the State in these matters is reflected in the Constitution (Article 9).

The principles of autonomy enunciated in the Constitution cannot, in our view, truly lead to Tibetans becoming masters of their own destiny if they are not sufficiently involved in decision-making on utilisation of natural resources such as mineral resources, waters, forests, mountains, grasslands, etc.

The ownership of land is the foundation on which the development of natural resources, taxes and revenues of an economy are based. Therefore, it is essential that only the nationality of the autonomous region shall have the legal authority to transfer or lease land, except land owned by the state. In the same manner, the autonomous region must have the independent authority to formulate and implement developmental plans concurrent to the state plans.

7) Economic Development and Trade

Economic Development in Tibet is welcome and much needed. The Tibetan people remain one of the most economically backward regions within the PRC.

The Constitution recognises the principle that the autonomous authorities have an important role to play in the economic development of their areas in view of local characteristics and needs (Article 118 of the Constitution, also reflected in LRNA Article 25). The Constitution also recognises the principle of autonomy in the administration and management of finances (Article 117, and LRNA Article 32). At the same time, the Constitution also recognises the importance of providing State funding and assistance to the autonomous areas to accelerate development (Article 122, LRNA Article 22).

Similarly, Article 31 of the LRNA recognises the competence of autonomous areas, especially those such as Tibet, adjoining foreign countries, to conduct border trade as well as trade with foreign countries. The recognition of these principles is important to the Tibetan nationality given the region's proximity to foreign countries with which the people have cultural, religious, ethnic and economic affinities.

The assistance rendered by the Central Government and the provinces has temporary benefits, but in the long run if the Tibetan people are not self-reliant and become dependent on others it has greater harm. Therefore, an important objective of autonomy is to make the Tibetan people economically self-reliant.

8) Public health

The Constitution enunciates the responsibility of the State to provide health and medical services (Article 21). Article 119 recognises that this is an area of responsibility of the autonomous areas. The LRNA (Article 40) also recognises the right of organs of self-government of the autonomous areas to "make independent decisions on plans for developing local medical and health services and for advancing both modern and the traditional medicine of the nationalities."

The existing health system fails to adequately cover the needs of the rural Tibetan population. According to the principles of the above-mentioned laws, the regional autonomous organs need to have the competencies and resources to cover the health need of the entire Tibetan population. They also need the competencies to promote the traditional Tibetan medical and astro system strictly according to traditional practice.

9) Public Security

In matters of public security it is important that the majority of security personnel consists of members of the local nationality who understand and respect local customs and traditions.

What is lacking in Tibetan areas is absence of decision-making authority in the hands of local Tibetan officials.

An important aspect of autonomy and self-government is the responsibility for the internal public order and security of the autonomous areas. The Constitution (Article 120) and LRNA (Article 24) recognise the importance of local involvement and authorise autonomous areas to organise their security within "the military system of the State and practical needs and with the approval of the State Council."

10) Regulation on population migration

The fundamental objective of national regional autonomy and self-government is the preservation of the identity, culture, language and so forth of the minority nationality and to ensure that it is the master of its own affairs. When applied to a particular territory in which the minority nationality lives in a concentrated community or communities, the very principle and purpose of national regional autonomy is disregarded if large scale migration and settlement of the majority Han nationality and other nationalities is encouraged and allowed. Major demographic changes that result from such migration will have the effect of assimilating rather than integrating the Tibetan nationality into the Han nationality and gradually extinguishing the distinct culture and identity of the Tibetan nationality. Also, the influx of large numbers of Han and other nationalities into Tibetan areas will fundamentally change the conditions necessary for the exercise of regional autonomy since the constitutional criteria for the exercise of autonomy, namely that the minority nationality "live in compact communities" in a particular territory is changed and undermined by the population movements and transfers. If such migrations and settlements continue uncontrolled, Tibetans will no longer live in a compact community or communities and will consequently no longer be entitled, under the Constitution, to national regional autonomy. This would effectively violate the very principles of the Constitution in its approach to the nationalities issue.

There is precedent in the PRC for restriction on the movement or residence of citizens. There is only a very limited recognition of the right of autonomous areas to work out measures to control "the transient population" in those areas. To us it would be vital that the autonomous organs of self-government have the authority to regulate the residence, settlement and employment or economic activities of persons who wish to move to Tibetan areas from other parts of the PRC in order to ensure respect for and the realisation of the objectives of the principle of autonomy.

It is not our intention to expel the non-Tibetans who have permanently settled in Tibet and have lived there and grown up there for a considerable time. Our concern is the induced massive movement of primarily Han but also some other nationalities into many areas of Tibet, upsetting existing communities, marginalising the Tibetan population there and threatening the fragile natural environment.

11) Cultural, educational and religious exchanges with other countries

Besides the importance of exchanges and cooperation between the Tibetan nationality and other nationalities, provinces, and regions of the PRC in the subject matters of autonomy, such as culture, art, education, science, public health, sports, religion, environment, economy and so forth, the power of autonomous areas to conduct such exchanges with foreign countries in these areas is also recognised in the LRNA (Article 42).

V APPLICATION OF A SINGLE ADMINISTRATION FOR THE TIBETAN NATIONALITY IN THE PRC

In order for the Tibetan nationality to develop and flourish with its distinct identity, culture and spiritual tradition through the exercise of self-government on the above mentioned basic Tibetan needs, the entire community, comprising all the areas currently designated by the PRC as Tibetan autonomous areas, should be under one single administrative entity. The current administrative divisions, by which Tibetan communities are ruled and administered under different provinces and regions of the PRC, foments fragmentation, promotes unequal development, and weakens the ability of the Tibetan nationality to protect and promote its common cultural, spiritual and ethnic identity. Rather than respecting the integrity of the nationality, this policy promotes its fragmentation and disregards the spirit of autonomy. Whereas the other major minority nationalities such as the Uighurs and Mongols govern themselves almost entirely within their respective single autonomous regions, Tibetans remain as if they were several minority nationalities instead of one.

Bringing all the Tibetans currently living in designated Tibetan autonomous areas within a single autonomous administrative unit is entirely in accordance with the constitutional principle contained in Article 4, also reflected in the LRNA (Article 2), that "regional autonomy is practiced in areas where people of minority nationalities live in concentrated communities." The LRNA describes regional national autonomy as the "basic policy adopted by the Communist Party of China for the solution of the national question in China" and explains its meaning and intent in its Preface:

the minority nationalities, under unified state leadership, practice regional autonomy in areas where they live in concentrated communities and set up organs of self-government for the exercise of the power of autonomy. Regional national autonomy embodies the state's full respect for and guarantee of the right of the minority nationalities to administer their internal affairs and its adherence to the principle of equality, unity and common prosperity of all nationalities.

It is clear that the Tibetan nationality within the PRC will be able to exercise its right to govern itself and administer its internal affairs effectively only once it can do so through an organ of self-government that has jurisdiction over the Tibetan nationality as a whole.

The LRNA recognises the principle that boundaries of national autonomous areas may need to be modified. The need for the application of the fundamental principles of the Constitution on regional autonomy through respect of the integrity of the Tibetan nationality is not only totally legitimate, but the administrative changes that may be required to achieve this in no way violate constitutional principles. There are several precedents where this has been actually done.

VI THE NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF THE AUTONOMY

The extent to which the right to self-government and self-administration can be exercised on the preceding subject matters largely determines the genuine character of Tibetan autonomy. The task at hand is therefore to look into the manner in which autonomy can be regulated and exercised for it to effectively respond to the unique situation and basic needs of the Tibetan nationality.

The exercise of genuine autonomy would include the right of Tibetans to create their own regional government and government institutions and processes that are best suited to their needs and characteristics. It would require that the People's Congress of the autonomous region have the power to legislate on all matters within the competencies of the region (that is the subject matters referred to above) and that other organs of the autonomous government have the power to execute and administer decisions autonomously. Autonomy also entails representation and meaningful participation in national decision-making in the Central Government. Processes for effective consultation and close cooperation or joint decision-making between the Central Government and the regional government on areas of common interest also need to be in place for the autonomy to be effective.

A crucial element of genuine autonomy is the guarantee the Constitution or other laws provide that powers and responsibilities allocated to the autonomous region cannot be unilaterally abrogated or changed. This means that neither the Central Government nor the autonomous region's government should be able, without the consent of the other, to change the basic features of the autonomy.

The parameters and specifics of such genuine autonomy for Tibet that respond to the unique needs and conditions of the Tibetan people and region should be set out in some detail in regulations on the exercise of autonomy, as provided for in Article 116 of the Constitution (enacted in LRNA Article 19) or, if it is found to be more appropriate, in a separate set of laws or regulations adopted for that purpose. The Constitution, including Article 31, provides the flexibility to adopt special laws to respond to unique situations such as the Tibetan one, while respecting the established social, economic and political system of the country.

The Constitution in Section VI provides for organs of self-government of national autonomous regions and acknowledges their power to legislate. Thus Article 116 (enacted in Article 19 of the LRNA) refers to their power to enact "separate regulations in light of the political, economic and cultural characteristics of the nationality or nationalities in the areas concerned." Similarly, the Constitution recognises the power of autonomous administration in a number of areas (Article 117-120) as well as the power of autonomous governments to apply flexibility in implementing the laws and policies of the Central Government and higher state organs to suit the conditions of the autonomous area concerned (Article 115).

The above-mentioned legal provisions do contain significant limitations to the decision-making authority of the autonomous organs of government. But the Constitution nevertheless recognises the principle that organs of self-government make laws and policy decisions that address local needs and that these may be different from those adopted elsewhere, including by the Central Government.

Although the needs of the Tibetans are broadly consistent with the principles on autonomy contained in the Constitution, as we have shown, their realisation is impeded because of the existence of a number of problems, which makes the implementation of those principles today difficult or ineffective.

Implementation of genuine autonomy, for example, requires clear divisions of powers and responsibilities between the Central Government and the government of the autonomous region with respect to subject matter competency. Currently there is no such clarity and the scope of legislative powers of autonomous regions is both uncertain and severely restricted. Thus, whereas the Constitution intends to recognise the special need for autonomous regions to legislate on many matters that affect them, the requirements of Article 116 for prior approval at the highest level of the Central Government - by the Standing Committee of National People's Congress (NPC) - inhibit the implementation of this principle of autonomy. In reality, it is only autonomous regional congresses that expressly require such approval, while the congresses of ordinary (not autonomous) provinces of the PRC do not need prior permission and merely report the passage of regulations to the Standing Committee of the NPC "for the record" (Article 100).

The exercise of autonomy is further subject to a considerable number of laws and regulations, according to Article 115 of the Constitution. Certain laws effectively restrict the autonomy of the autonomous region, while others are not always consistent with one another. The result is that the exact scope of the autonomy is unclear and is not fixed, since it is unilaterally changed with the enactment of laws and regulations are higher levels of the state, and even by changes in policy. There is also no adequate process for consultation or for settling differences that arise between the organs of the Central Government and of the regional government with respect to the scope and exercise of autonomy. In practice, the resulting uncertainty limits the initiative of regional authorities and impedes the exercise of genuine autonomy by Tibetans today.

We do not at this stage wish to enter into details regarding these and other impediments to the exercise of genuine autonomy today by Tibetans, but mention them by way of example so that these may be addressed in the appropriate manner in our dialogue in the future. We will continue to study the Constitution and other relevant legal provisions and, when appropriate, will be pleased to provide further analysis of these issues, as we understand them.

VII THE WAY FORWARD

As stated at the beginning of this memorandum, our intention is to explore how the needs of the Tibetan nationality can be met within the framework of PRC since we believe these needs are consistent with the principles of the Constitution on autonomy. As His Holiness the Dalai Lama stated on a number of occasions, we have no hidden agenda. We have no intention at all of using any agreement on genuine autonomy as stepping stone for separation from the PRC.

The objective of the Tibetan Government in Exile is to represent the interests of the Tibetan people and to speak on their behalf. Therefore, it will no longer be needed and will be dissolved once an agreement is reached between us. In fact, His Holiness has reiterated his decision not to accept any political office in Tibet at any time in the future. His Holiness the Dalai Lama, nevertheless, plans to use all his personal influence to ensure such an agreement would have the legitimacy necessary to obtain the support of the Tibetan people.

Given these strong commitments, we propose that the next step in this process be the agreement to start serious discussions on the points raised in this memorandum. For this purpose we propose that we discuss and agree on a mutually agreeable mechanism or mechanisms and a timetable to do so effectively.

Source:【西藏论坛】http://tibetalk.com/bbs/index.php?all=313

Is Political Dissent Possible in China Today? (Part 3 of 3)

[Written for the Italian journal MicroMega's special issue on the Beijing Olympics, June 11, 2008; with minor modifications, Oct 8, 2008]


V. The Spirit of Political Dissent in Defiance

Ever since June 1989, the world has identified human courage and dignity in China with the “Tank Man” who stands alone in front of a long row of tanks to stop them with his defiant will. More than nineteen years later, another generation has grown up. Without easy access to information about the Tian’anmen pro-democracy movement and its tragic ending, has China’s younger generation forgotten that spirit completely, to show the world the achievement of the government’s effort to depoliticize the society? What does political situation mean to millions of ordinary people engaged in socio-political movements elsewhere in the world?

Ahead of the fifteenth anniversary of the Tian’anmen massacre in 2004, Shi Tao, a young poet and journalist born in 1968, sent an e-mail message using his yahoo account to a New York-based pro-democracy online journal. In it he passed information about the government’s preparation for potential political disturbances at the anniversary, which he had learned from a meeting where no note-taking was allowed. At the same time, he produced a series of touching poems full of painful memories and burning passion. In at least two poems, he predicted his confrontation with plainclothes police and his own arrest. It eventually arrived. Shi Tao was sentenced to ten-year imprisonment for “subversion,” with evidence supplied by Yahoo to the Chinese police.

If Shi Tao acted explicitly on behalf of his comrades at Tian’anmen Square fifteen years earlier, some others took up causes of political dissent more recently. Like Wu Lihong, the peasant environmental activist by Lake Tai in Jiangsu province, many of them started as volunteers in social welfare charity work, but eventually fell out with local authorities and then with the political system as a whole.

Chen Guangcheng, born in 1971, was from a village near Linyi City in Shandong Province. He lost his sight in his childhood but nonetheless managed to train himself as a legal consultant and an activist for local villagers since the late nineties. He was prompted into determined action in early 2005 after learning about the thousands of cases of brutality against peasant women by local authorities forcefully carrying out the one-child policy. By late summer, the National Family Planning and Population Commission took up the issue and publicly recognized Chen’s effort. However, the commission does not have any real power over local governments, even though its policies were frequently taken as excuse by local officials to bully peasants or extort extra incomes. At the same time when the commission said Linyi officials related to the issue had been punished, Chen was put under house arrest by local police.

Complicating the situation were foreign journalists. Beijing just started to give greater freedom to foreign journalists to go around the country. They learned about Chen’s activism and the Time magazine already published an interview with him in the summer. Next year, Chen was named one of the 100 most influential persons of the world in 2006, together with the filmmaker Ang Lee and China’s Premier Wen Jiabao. Beijing was obviously not pleased with the publicity. In the following months, Chen was tried for “damaging property and organizing a mob to disturb traffic” and was sentenced to more than four years in prison. His three lawyers were beaten by local thugs, detained by police and prevented to attend the trial. When decision was to be announced on his final appeal in January 2007, members of a German television station were also physically abused in Chen’s village. Summer 2007, Chen was awarded the Ramon Magsaysay Award in Manila, the Philippines, for emergent leadership. His wife was prevented from going to the award ceremony and put into house-arrest herself, together with a baby son not yet three-year-old.

While Chen was struggling, he and his wife were supported and cared after whenever they traveled to Beijing by a young couple, Hu Jia and his wife Zeng Jinyan. Born in 1973, Hu Jia had been an AIDS activist for years when he met Zeng. Ten years younger than Hu, Zeng at beginning was skeptical of the many tales Hu was telling her. She also had hesitation, uncertain if Hu should get himself into all those troubles with the authorities. Essentially, she was transformed into a determined activist by the experience of grieve anxiety, when Hu Jia “disappeared” for 41 days in early 2006 while police showed the ugly face of the state power. Here we see clearly that, with all internal contradictions, the Chinese education system is still capable of producing truly idealistic, courageous young people.

The years since they got married have not been an easy time for the young lady. Hu Jia was placed under house-arrestment for almost a whole year in 2006-2007. Both of them kept active networking with other activists and frequent writing on the Internet. While Hu was unable to leave home, Zeng attended training programs run by the Focus group in Thailand and the World Social Forum India in late 2006. Next year, she herself was named one of the 100 influential people of the world by the Time magazine. Bad omen. By the end of 2007, not long after she gave birth to their daughter, Hu Jia was taken away. He has since been sentenced to three-and-a-half-years into prison. Zeng herself has been under house-arrest for months by now, together with her infant daughter, helped mainly by her mother. When Zeng’s mother left Beijing earlier this year, police stepped up their surveillance and harassment. Neighbors and her baby’s nanny were all visited by police at home, checked with information of all their family members, and warned against letting their own babies to play with Zeng’s.

If anything, what shared by the case of Shi Tao, Chen Guangcheng, Hu Jia and Zeng Jinyan are the followings. First, they might start with charity works, but they all held clear political visions and explicitly raised political demands. Second, in raising sensitive political issues, they focused their attention on the disadvantaged social groups. Third, their cases, particularly Chen Guangcheng and the Hu-Zeng couple, infuriated the Chinese government and its security forces the most by their connections to the outside world, be it foreign media or foreign activists. It has become inherent to the CCP’s political culture that official hierarchy is more important than anything else. For the CCP, bringing in foreign factors for the purpose of adding on political pressure is the greater crime than challenging authorities locally. For it breaks the rules of its own game. Thus, the punishment received not only by Chen and Hu, but also their wives and their young babies. Beijing shows its real color in these cases, when it deliberately courted world capitals and easily dismissed international solidarity of today’s grassroots socialist movement, such as those represented by the World Social Forum India and by the Magsaysay award in the Philippines.

Here we may recall the environmental cases in the cities of Xiamen and Shanghai, mentioned earlier, when citizens’ “collective walks” took place, as if there was no political intention, no organizer, and not one single individual to be taken responsible. The question and challenge to social movement worldwide would be this: Do we believe in political dissent? Do we accept substitution of valuing political dissent by prioritizing cooperation with political establishment? Do we believe that, under whichever kind of situation, improvement of living standard is always more important than promoting political consciousness? Chinese people hold unrealized political potentials with great energy that has not been relished yet. We might see a very different China once the people can openly, freely pick up political topics concerning the world as well as concerning their own lives.

-- Los Angeles, June 11, 2008


[1] Wang Hui, Qu zhengzhi hua de zhengzhi: Duan 20 shiji de zhongjie yu 90 niandai (Depoliticizing politics: The end of the short twentieth century and the nineties), Beijing, 2008, p. 7, 14, 15, 55-56.

[2] E.g., see ibid, pp. 15-20. Wang Hui’s discussion on theoretical debates in 1979-1983 (ibid, pp. 21-22) raises more questions that are beyond the scope of this paper. For views differing from Wang Hui’s, for instance, see Cui Weiping, "Weishenme meiyou chunfeng chuifu dadi" (Why there was no wind of spring over the land), http://www.xschina.org/show.php?id=11741 , last visited on October 8, 2008; Sixiang (Reflextion), no. 6 (August 2007), Taipei, Linking Publishing.

[3] http://www.reviewing.cn/fact/2008/0606/article_520.html (in Chinese), last visited on June 10, 2008.

[4] http://ccdv.people.com.cn/GB/66982/5876850.html (in Chinese), last visited on June 10, 2008; and New York Times at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/06/world/asia/06pollute.html?ref=asia

Is Political Dissent Possible in China Today? (Part 2 of 3)

[Written for the Italian journal MicroMega's special issue on the Beijing Olympics, June 11, 2008; with minor modifications, Oct 7, 2008]


III. Changing Social-Political Landscape

The fact that Wu Lihong was honored in Beijing as one of the 2005 top ten national environmentalists itself indicates important social-political changes taking place in China. As the country moved from its previous practice of “socialist planned economy” to a “socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics,” the central government under financial pressure in the early 1990s got rid, first of all, of its social welfare obligations, in education and public healthcare in particular. Not surprisingly, with rising living standard and the emergence of middle class and urban new riches, issues concerning the society’s general well-being were the first to gather voluntary participation and gain government tolerance. In other words, social diversification, brought about by three decades of reform, has made it possible for a “society” to practically prioritize its interest over the interest of the “nation,” whereas the “state” is relatively neutralized and the Party itself is forced to take a back seat in this kind of contest for legitimacy discourse.

The best example of such structural alternation will have to be the almost spontaneous, nationwide mobilization in the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake, mentioned at the beginning of this essay. But the changes started much earlier, as can be seen in the 1999 prize-winning film, Not One Less, by Zhang Yimou. The credit roll at the end of the film includes explicit call for donations to support basic education in China’s poor rural areas. Shifting the burden of social welfare from the state to the shoulder of the society or even to that of foreign philanthropic organizations had not been a difficult transformation for the CCP government to adapt.

This is not to say that the State and the Party sat through these changes idly. From the start and up to this moment, they have been watching vigilantly. However, instead of mobilizing societal energy for the general good, their preoccupation has been predominantly against social organizations with political potentials. A careful look at the most-wanted lists issued immediately following the Tian’anmen crackdown will tell you that, in addition to influential intellectuals, most names there were previously unheard of at all, who became the top enemies of the state precisely for their direct involvement in organizing autonomous associations among students, workers and ordinary citizens. Similarly, Jiang Zemin, CCP’s former Secretary-general (1989-2002), launched severe persecution against the Fa-lun-gong sector after the religious group staged a surprise demonstration just outside Zhongnanhai, the housing compound of the CCP’s top leaders in central Beijing. Fa-lun-gong’s mobilization ability shown in the demonstration made it impossible for the CCP to give the crackdown a second thought.

The oppressive logic of the Party did not stop at mass organizations staging actual big demonstrations. Yang Zili, a young physics graduate from the prestigious Peking University, was sentenced to eight years for “subversion” in 2003, for the crime of writing critical political commentaries on his website and for organizing a small study group. Three of his comrades were imprisoned at the same time. Ironically, the name they chose for their little group was “New Youth,” exactly the same as the name of the iconoclastic journal run by the CCP’s founding general-secretary, Chen Duxiu, more than 80 years ago. The Party certainly knows its own history perfectly well - free political association could easily lead to mass mobilization and social movement, posing real threats to its hold of the state power. A few years earlier, the CCP views it as a must to crash on the dissidents who sought to establish a China Democracy Party in 1997; now, Beijing also sees it as necessary to punish young intellectuals like Yang Zili.

Not surprisingly, giving permission to NGOs to provide charity service to the society became delicately challenging at all levels. Similarly challenging are new communication technologies, such as the Internet, the mobile phone, and text-messaging. Together with the changing social-political landscape, described earlier, the society is opening up considerably for initiatives. Of all the issues, environmental protection seems to be the most powerful magnet, bounding together otherwise atomized city dwellers to fight against vested interests of developers, business owners, and government officials. When a big chemical plant with Taiwanese money was to start construction at the southeast coast city Xiamen and the municipal authorities announced tough rules against non-official mass rallies, the citizens text-messaged each other for “collective walk” in front of the city hall for three consecutive days last year. Under growing public anger, the project was eventually moved to a less populated rural setting (without further hearing on pollution threat to the rural community). Similar tactic was then adapted by Shanghai residents, in their fight against an unpopular infrastructure project with high-volume noise pollution possibilities. News about these events spread fast and wide on the Internet. “Collective walk,” thus, has since become a politically charged word for actions of civil disobedience.

As a matter of fact, environmental groups are mushrooming in Chinese cities, and so are volunteer associations of charity groups on various themes: rural education, basic healthcare, AIDS, homosexuality, natural disaster relief, and so forth. Many contributed at the earliest instance to the earthquake rescue and relief in May this year. Intellectuals and scholars working on rural problems have set up special training programs in selected countryside locations, recruiting college students to work together with poor peasants during school vacations. These new developments have loosened the nerves of the authorities so much that the Organization Department of the CCP’s central committee has launched a new program, starting from this year, to recruit 100,000 college graduates in five years to serve as local cadres at village level. It has no doubt helped to raise social awareness among college students.

Heightened social awareness among college students in recent years is also thanks to new trends in academic humanities and social sciences, hugely influenced by their American counterparts that emphasize cultural studies in themes and field-work in methodology. Urban wealth, commercial interest, tourism development, as well as increasing cultural exchanges, awakened general curiosity about China itself, its history, its geography, its many regional diversities in dialects, customs, cuisines, climates and cultural relics. One particular aspect of vibrant social life, benefited by cultural exchanges with outside world, is religious activities. Large number of college students now is Christian converts. Officially registered Christian churches claim more than 30 million members, but scholars’ estimations are about two or three times of that number. Increasing inter-communications with other East Asian countries have made equally important contributions to reviving interest in religion. Temples of Daoism, Buddhism, and other folk religions, built brand new or repaired from old ruins – possibly inflicted during the Cultural Revolution that vowed to sweep the world clean of all religions – in as many cities as villages, are receiving crowded visitors at traditional holidays, which often pose risk of stampede and required extra police force for safeguarding. According to the estimation based on two Shanghai professors’ research, China today has more than 300 million people who hold religious faith of one kind or another.

IV. The Tibetans

If the society is really so diversified, lively, and with high degree of social awareness, one might ask, why the Han Chinese reacted so strongly, uniformly, aggressively and rather chauvinistically (see below) towards the Lhasa riots in Tibet earlier this year? To understand this, we need to keep in mind a couple of points. First, growing social awareness, encouraged by economic development and tolerated by the authorities, is not exactly the same as political consciousness. Likewise, charitable work cannot supplant political demands from below. Distinctions such as these may be subtle, but they are never completely submerged into each other. It is the job of the cultural police to watch out that these boundaries are not to be crossed, on the Internet or on the streets. People need to feel good about themselves, a sense which charitable work could safely provide. Political questions, on the other hand, might easily make people uncomfortable just like the state could be challenged, probably unnecessarily. Talking about the rich-poor gap is ubiquitous by the Chinese nowadays, which is partly the bases for growing interest in charity work. Yet, talks about political rights for the poor are completely another matter. In this sense, the Chinese society has been indeed depoliticized to a considerable extent.

Second, similar to policy debates at the top, vibrant cultural life at the society level usually carries a trace of nationalistic rhetoric. As a young intellectual commented, the Chinese today believe that China is a “normal country” just like any other one, with its own distinctive cultural characteristics. We can do what other people are doing, but we prefer doing it our own way, be it charity work or Buddhism worshipping. Behind this thinking, anxiety over recognition by the “international community” is clearly visible. The fixed sight is on the West (or lesser partners of the abstract “West”), and the “China” or “Chinese culture” is to be defined by a collective “Chinese” that is, generally speaking, Han Chinese only.

Historically, the PRC did entertain the idea of Soviet-style ethnic republics, but for a very short period only. The same is true about ethnic equality in general. Before 1958, the PRC was actually very enthusiastic about identifying and developing minority nationalities within its territorial boundaries. Ethnographical teams were sent out and totally 55 ethnic “nationalities” were identified. At least 14 written scripts were created for 12 ethnic groups that did never developed one for themselves before, and many other scripts were reformed, regrouped, and experimented within the concerned population. These actions were generally halted by 1958 and further impeded by the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, for the sake of “speeding up and running directly into communism” that would no longer acknowledge ethnic differences anyway. Economic recession, understandably, went much worse in minority ethnic areas than in Han regions, due to severe cultural and linguistic damage. There was indeed a short period of beneficial ethnic policy in 1977-1985, which, unfortunately, slowed down to almost complete stop in the nineties, due to the central government’s developmental position that focused on economic growth and almost nothing else. By official statistics in 2005, ethnic minority was 8.41% of China’s total population, but 45% of the total poverty population nationwide. Of officially identified “poverty counties” across the country, minority ethnic autonomous counties, once again, took up 45% of the total.

On the other hand, though ethnic minorities are less than ten percent of China’s total population, they occupy 64% of the PRC’s entire territory. A large proportion of the 64% is historically Tibetan inhabited areas. Tibet is also along a very long stretch of China’s 22,000 kilometers of inland border with other countries. These are the hard facts of the “Tibetan Question” today.

Has Tibetan areas been experiencing “cultural genocide” as the Dalai Lama claims? “Yes” and “no.” “Yes,” because official documents issued by the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) government are nowadays mostly written in Chinese, often without Tibetan translation at all; Most governmental meetings are conducted in Mandarin Chinese instead of Tibetan; Recruitment examinations for civil servant positions are mostly conducted in Chinese instead of Tibetan; Elementary schools for Tibetan children in Lhasa have adapted to using Chinese as first language and Tibetan as the second. The main reason for such phenomena is the PRC’s top official appointment practice. The CCP simply couldn’t trust any Tibetans to be at the top of the TAR leadership. Its Party Secretary, the real boss of the region, has been taken up by Han Chinese one after another for decades. They were often transferred in short notice from other regions and did never feel the pressure to learn the native language.

In addition, with Beijing’s unceasing assault on the fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tibetan Buddhism – a faith followed in varied forms by the majority of Tibetan population – is agonizing with its fragmented identity. With his charisma and international standing, whatever happens to him in the future, the fourteenth Dalai Lama is bound to become another legend in Tibetan cultural memory, just in the same way as one of his predecessors, the sixth Dalai Lama, a romantic poet fondly remembered in Tibetan folklores. Beijing’s pragmatic-thinking top leaders apparently have not registered this possibility. It is generally believed that the Chinese government is patiently waiting for the day when a reincarnation procedure will have to be enacted under its control inside China, in order to choose a successor of the current Dalai Lama. With this thinking firmly in their mind, whenever social unrests taking place in Tibetan areas, the authorities would jump upon all Tibetans, forcing them one by one to make public denouncement against the current Dalai Lama. Amazingly, or maybe not by accident, the method is exactly the same applied to all of the Chinese in the PRC during the Cultural Revolution. By so doing, instead of turning the Dalai Lama into its own political assets, Beijing has created a formidable windmill for itself to busy fighting against eternally. The political reeducation sessions forced upon every Tibetan inside China have been the most humiliating experience to the young, educated Tibetans living in Han Chinese cities in particular. Many of them actually have some spoken Tibetan only, unable to fully express themselves in the written language, let alone to keep that language’s beauty in some living, rejuvenating forms for future generations. This deeper sense of national humiliation has been simply reinforced by Beijing’s crude and cruel tactics against their fellow Tibetans remaining on the Roof of the World.

On the other hand, with more than 80% Tibetan population still living as farmers and going to rural schools or Buddhist monasteries that teach Tibetan as first language, there is no immanent danger of Tibetan culture disappearing from the world. On the contrary, with commercialization and loosened political control in East Tibet in particular, there have been more Tibetan periodicals in China’s Tibetan areas than ever before, much more lively than Tibetan print culture in the exile communities in northern India. Growing tourism, encouraged by Beijing with preferable policies and extra investment, has brought many Tibetan youth into closer contact with their traditions than, say, thirty years ago. They are creating lively cultural life in Tibetan cities and towns not just for tourists, but also for themselves. Like their Han counterpart, what in need is formal political recognition and protection of their rights. Unlike their Han Chinese counterpart, the younger generation of Tibetans keenly feel the need, longing for greater freedom to develop their national identity. For them, the Dalai Lama is mainly in this sense to be an important political symbol. Also in this sense, we may say, Beijing has been playing foolishly for unable to fully grasp the depth of the Tibetan Question.

Is Political Dissent Possible in China Today? (Part 1 of 3)

[Written for the Italian journal MicroMega's special issue on the Beijing Olympics, June 11, 2008; with minor modifications, Oct 6, 2008]

News stories from China often provide, to say the least, conflicting pictures about social political life in the country. For example, a series of incidents since early March this year has seen startling changing faces of the Chinese public. Authoritarian manipulations notwithstanding, political passion in the country has been undoubtedly running at its highest point since the 1989 Tian’anmen protests. In particular, the urban masses demonstrated enthusiastic support to the government’s heavy-handed suppression of Tibetan protests in March, to the world torch relay of the Beijing Olympic Games (to be held in August) in April, and to the victims of the May 12 earthquake – massively devastating – in Sichuan province. Thousands of volunteers rushed to the damaged areas to offer help. Meanwhile, an almost unprecedented press freedom followed at the heel of the earthquake, not only covering heroic rescue missions but also exposing man-made tragedies, such as thousands of children buried by the instant collapse of under-standard school buildings. The government’s quick responses to the school building controversy were only partly due to pressures from the parents. To be sure, public outcry played a much grater role in this case.

Does it mean political participation has become the norm of public life or political dissent against the government is publicly tolerable in today’s China? The answer will, perhaps, have to be “No” or at least “Not yet,” with some twist concerning China’s recent history.

I. Depoliticized Politics of the Party

Wang Hui of Tsinghua University in Beijing believes that, corresponding to China’s economic integration into capitalist globalization worldwide, the politics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been depoliticized, turning the PRC’s previous party-state into today’s state-party. In this way, the CCP has lost its political vitality, if not yet completely its mandate as well, becoming highly dependent on the state’s power and its apparatus. Now the Party is deeply entrenched in developmentalism in both ideology and practice. The transformation, Wang Hui implies, is a betrayal of the Party’s earlier, more revolutionary tradition that saw vigorous debates – either theoretical or policy-oriented – engendering real mass politics. On the other hand, depoliticizing tendency is inherent to all modern political parties. To counter the tendency and retain the revolution’s political vigor, Mao relied on mass mobilization, such as launching the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). The cause behind many human tragedies taking place at the time, Wang Hui argues, was exactly due to the Party’s depoliticizing tendency, manifesting itself most of all in the form of power struggles between political factions within the top leadership. [1]

Such an interpretation recognizes the historical significance of the Chinese revolution in general and its politicizing impact on the working class in particular, which has informed most cases of worker protest since the 1990s. But, the interpretation also clearly points to the fact that politics in Mao’s PRC was always the monopoly of the CCP, at least always nominally guided by the Party or by Mao himself personally. Mass political participation was promoted and rebellion against bureaucratization of the socialist state was indeed encouraged at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Experiencing the sudden collapse of established social hierarchy, the young and the active ones were prompted to “heterodoxy” thinking avidly, often in underground fashions. This has been another stimulating legacy of those years, often directly informing today’s social activism.

Above the ground, the Cultural Revolution soon had its own reversal; whereupon, in the last years of the upheaval, China’s social, economic and political orders were mashed together to the greatest extent possible, with almost the entire population organized into semi-military units of minimal social mobility, maintained largely through endless ideological campaigns. The practice lowered the level of administrative sophistication considerably, as well as sweeping away cultural, ethnic and religious differences mercilessly. The three decades of reform has seen the actual falling apart of this order. The Party’s depoliticization process since 1979 [2] is epitomized by Deng Xiaoping’s colorful expressions: “It doesn’t matter if a cat is white or black; what matters is the cat can catch mice;” “No debate” about what is socialism and what is capitalism; “Get rich is glorious;” and “Development is the irrefutable truth.” Deng might be determined to get rid of ideological debate inside the Party. However, this does not at all mean that he was ready to give up suppression of political dissent.

Political dissent was never a valued virtue for the ruling Party, within or without. Bapa Phunsto Wangye, founder of Tibetan Communist Party who helped to bring the CCP’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into Tibet in 1951, lost his own freedom for twenty years when he spoke out, as a CCP member, against the Party’s Tibetan policy in the late 1950s. As for the Cultural Revolution’s beginning years mentioned above, its sense of liberation for young students, like its appearance of chaos in the country, came always with unmistakable boundaries imposed by Mao and his allied comrades. For even then, to engage in “unorthodox,” independent thinking could mean great personal risk, from long-term imprisonment to immediate execution. Of hundreds of thousands people who perished in the decade, three individuals stand out and are remembered with great admiration by later generations. Lin Zhao (1932-1968), Yu Luoke (1942-1970), and Zhang Zhixin (1930-1975), independent of each other, all met with death squad for their daring ideas at relatively young age.

By comparison, Deng and his successors in the Reform era have been much lenient to individual political dissenters. Yet, the government on the whole is no less vigilant against any potential challenges to their power and no less ruthless and brutal in suppressing challengers, imagined or real. This lies at the root of Deng Xiaoping’s decision to move huge amount of PLA troops into Beijing to quell the pro-democracy movement on Tian’anmen Square in 1989. The Tian’anmen Mother group, led by Ding Zilin who lost her seventeen-year-old son in the wee hour of June Fourth, 1989, has been fighting not only for obtaining the truth about their beloved ones missing in the crackdown, but also for mourning the victims freely, openly, and living a normal life without constant surveillance and harassment by the National Security police force. Fear of political challenge also determined Jiang Zemin’s heavy-handed persecution against the religious group, Fa-lun-gong, since 1999. Many Fu-lun-gong practitioners suffered police harassment and brutality for years. Nonetheless, manners of political suppression are undergoing significant changes. Nowadays, except in Tibetan areas (more later), the Party’s key concern is no longer to squeeze out personal confessions or physically wipe out the “unfit,” so much so as to silence the voice and destroy the courage.

II. Depoliticizing the Society, Coercively

Wang Hui’s account of China’s depoliticizing process explicitly concerns the CCP and the Chinese state, but only vaguely implying a similar process happening to the Chinese society as well. The logic seems to suggest that a depoliticizing and depoliticized politics internal to the CCP is identifiable with politics in China as a whole. If so, this would be a serious misreading of the reality. Since the end of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, the Chinese society has been continuously diversified, economically and politically. However, the society and its people did not take the depoliticizing, commercializing path without a fight.

In the Reform era, with Deng Xiaoping’s developmentalist guidance that shuns ideological debate, new slogans issued by CCP’s leaders, such as the “three represents,” “basing everything on humanity,” “relating to the people” and “building up harmonious society” are functioning figuratively than substantially in organizing social life. Policy debates are never based on these slogans but, indeed, hinged on ideological rationalizations, usually with one side emphasizing the centralized state in need to unify political and economic power, and the other promoting free market and private interests as the key to stimulate sustained economic growth. While nether side would touch on mass mobilization of the labor class any more, neo-liberal defenders are actually no less rhetorically concerned with a strong nation than their supposed left-leaning opponents. As political institutional reform has not moved much to anywhere, party cadres at all levels have been like a political commissar without reliable ideological compass except upholding “state interest,” almost completely relieved from the old pressure to cling to ideological correctness. At the same time, thanks to residue socio-political structure from the previous period, they sit like a judge or referee over the fast-changing society of diversified interests, while keeping firm grip of the greatest social, political and economic power over all other competing interests. The double-role of being the referee of one’s own performance has enabled Party officials to play with ideological discourses of the old and the new alike, all to their own advantages.

The situation has been classical for brewing official corruption and causing serious social conflict. All social groups naturally have eagerly looked for political expressions for their own interest. Rather than “automatically” depoliticized by smooth talkers of neo-liberal free-market principles, the masses were constantly mobilized into political actions by the daily social transformations in their lives. If their actions have not led to any sustained political movement with historical significance, it was mainly because rising social conflicts are often handled by the state ruthlessly at first, as if dealing with “class enemies” in the old days, before the government might gradually make policy readjustment or administrative reorientations to reduce tensions on the ground. A few well-covered examples might remind us how changes were brought about in Chinese society with political implications in the last decade.

Industrial restructure – a euphemism for privatization of state-owned or collective-owned firms – became one of the key programs in China’s reform since the mid nineties. The Liaoyang Ferro-Alloy Factory in Liaoning Province used to be a state-owned well-performing, profitable firm with thousands of workers in the eighties, and is still well-performing, profitable as a private firm today, owned by associates of former municipal officials, with less workers and worse working conditions. Between 1993-2001, corrupt officials managed to push the factory into filing for bankruptcy, with worker’s salaries unpaid for as much as for 22 months. Most workers were against bankruptcy filing, demanding transparency in auditing and approval by the worker’s congress. When all failed, they took on the streets in early 2002. Four of their leaders were arrested, but the workers persisted. The municipal authorities deliberately accused two leading old workers for unverified membership in the outlawed China Democracy Party. Yao Fuxin and Xiao Yunliang were sentenced for “subversion” for seven and four years, respectively. At the same time, the city diversified 20 million yuan to pay off all the rear pays to the workers within a year. In the same year following the workers protest, Premier Wen Jiabao visited the northeast Rustbelt three times, committing the central government to reviving the old industrial base there. Yet, economic demands may be met, but explicit political activism must be punished. To this date, Yao is still serving his term. [3]

One factor affecting the outcome of the Liaoyang case is the wide coverage by both domestic and foreign media of the worker’s protest, which put great pressure on Beijing to demand the municipal government find a quick settlement. Similar factors often come into play in social conflicts in the countryside, too. They often brought out similar outcomes as well, with leading individual activists punished while the general situation improved gradually to various degrees.

Wu Lihong was a peasant activist for more than a decade when he was named among China’s top ten environmentalists at the Great Hall of People in Beijing in late 2005. His hometown is by Lake Tai, the third largest fresh water body in China, and near Yixing City in Jiangsu Province, not far from Shanghai. Since the 1980s, the lake area had attracted legions of chemical factories that are big in both their contribution to local revenue incomes and polluting the once scenery lake. In his tireless effort, Wu documented more than 2,000 chemical firms by the lakeside and helped to close down some 200 big polluters. Yixing’s officials worked hard to turn the bad publicity into positive image-building, earning the city a title of “national model in environmental protection” in late 2006. Wu was not convinced. He was to go to Beijing for further petitions when dozens of policemen stormed his home and took him away in April 2007, accusing him for “extortion” and corruption. Yet, Yixing’s bad publicity turned to worse in a month, when the most serious algae scum in Lake Tai’s history occurred, threatening 200 million urban population with polluted drinking water. Government agencies at all levels jumped to the emergency, but the municipal authorities did not budge in Wu’s case. He was sentenced to three years in prison. Water quality continued to decline, according to official report, and new regulations taking effect this month are to subject chemical factories around Lake Tai to penalties five times higher than before. It is not clear if any of the Yixing officials being disciplined in any manner; or more likely if they collected credit for overcoming the public hazard. Clearly, neither the central nor the provincial government acted on Wu’s behalf to demand a fairer hearing than the 30 minutes allotted to him. Wu is still serving his sentence. [4]